The paper has since long been finished, but I figured it might be wise not to let it collect dust and better share it with the world. Who knows, it might help some other students!
This paper is written by Thomas Jansen, KU Leuven, 2009. Do not copy or plagiarize!
Posted in Uncategorized
The first draft of Chapter II is finished and bears the name “Chapter II – Japan as a civilian power”.
After formulating a historic overview of Japan-EU relations in chapter I, the next step was to move to the post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era an ambitious initiative was launched through the 2001 Joint Action Plan. Chapter II starts out with this Joint Action plan and its objectives to be reached in a “Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation”. However, when the Action Plan was formulated, little did they know about the things to come in this decade. I’m talking about ‘the War on Terror’, emerging environmental problems, energy crises and so on. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate the outcome after almost a decade of cooperation.
The main part of this chapter analyses the various important norms and actors in Japanese foreign security policy and how it strokes with the policies of another emerging civilian power, the EU. However, when observing these actors, it is clear that the US is a very influential partner to EU/Japan foreign policy and that cooperation in security fields often implies the US as a third actor one way or the other.
Or so it would seem. In the last part of chapter two, an interesting irregularity is mentioned. When it comes to Southeast Asia, it appears the US isn’t as present as it is in other parts of Asia. The main international actors in this region are Japan, China, the EU and increasingly Australia as well. The question is raised if Southeast Asia might provide an opportunity for Japan and the EU to engage in closer security cooperation, without the need for the US as a liason.
The main sources used in writing this chapter, were Atanassova’s “Change and Continuity in Japanese post-Cold War Security Policy: the role of the Self-Defence Forces in the US-Japan alliance and perspectives of foreign policy theories” and Hook’s “Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics and security”. Atanassova’s work provided me with good insight vis-à-vis Japan’s security policy and the US factor involved. Regarding Hook’s volume, ..well…you have to see it to believe it, but it is the most complete compendium of Japanese foreign policy I’ve ever seen. All norms, all actors, all regions and all international relations, be it economic , political or security, …. it’s all in there. Basically, a must-read to any serious student/researcher on Japanese foreign policy!
This is my provisional list of references (not complete by far).
- 2001 Joint Action Plan. Accessed through European Commission DG External Relations. “The EU and Japan” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/japan/index_en.htm (Last retrieved on April 5, 2009)
- Atanassova, Elena. Change and Continuity in Japanese post-Cold War Security Policy: the role of the Self-Defence Forces in the US-Japan alliance and perspectives of foreign policy theories. Leuven: K.U. Leuven, 2006.
- Gilson, Julie. Japan and the European Union: a partnership for the twenty-first century? Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
- Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics and security. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Kantei 1. Kantei. “Prime Minister Koizumi Encourages Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) to be Dispatched to Iraq” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/02/01asahikawa_e.html (Last retrieved on April 5, 2009)
- Kwei-Bo Huang, “Reflections on conflict management and third-party intervention in East Asia,” in Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia: third-party mediation in regional conflict, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Kwei-bo Huang and Chung-Chian Teng, 269-277. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Kyodo News. “Aso again says no election soon.” The Japan Times Online http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090316a2.html (Last retrieved on March 30, 2009)
- Mendle, Wolf. Japan’s Asia Policy: regional security and global interests. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
- MOFA counterterrorism assistance. MOFA “Japan’s counterterrorism assistance” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/assist0306.html (Last retrieved on April 4, 2009)
- MOFA Mindanao. MOFA “Japan takes a more active role in the Mindanao Peace Process” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/meet0607.html (Last retrieved on April 4, 2009)
- MOFA terrorism ODA. MOFA “Japan’s International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/coop0710.html (Last retrieved on April 4, 2009)
- MOFA UNMIN. MOFA “国連ネパール政治ミッションへの我が国要員の派遣について” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/np_haken.html (Last retrieved April 5, 2009)
- MOFA UNMIT pdf. MOFA “国連東ティモール統合ミッション” http://www.mofa.go.jp/ (Last retrieved on April 4, 2009)
- Smith, Anthony L., “Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: the strong silent type,” in Japan in a Dynamic Asia: coping with the new security challenges, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye, 179-198. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.
- The Constitution of Japan. Accessed through Kantei “The Constitution of Japan” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Last retrieved on April 5, 2009)
- Vogel, Steven K. (editor). U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
And this is the conclusion of chapter II.
In this chapter, various important actors and interests to Japanese security policy were discussed. Although originally concentrating on becoming an economic powerhouse in East Asia, Japan came under increased outside pressure from mainly the US to reform its foreign security policy with the end of the Cold War. Norms of anti-militarism (Article 9) and internationalism presented Japanese decision-makers with alternative ways to adhere to the principle of pacifism and take up a more representative international role in security nonetheless. As an emerging civilian power, Japan was able to bolster bilateralism with the US under Koizumi, but by providing supplemental strategies in more comprehensive security fields, thus not by pursuing conventional power . This broader security notion, which we already explained in the introduction, includes environmental degradation, energy security, terrorism, sustainable management of natural resources and supporting economic stability, while promoting international law and UN involvement. Illustrative of Japan’s commitments in these new security fields, is Tokyo’s policy in Southeast Asia. Through UNPKO, anti-piracy measures, counterterrorism support and an ‘Asian’ approach to human rights (the norm of ‘Asianism’), Japan makes substantial ‘civilian power’ contributions to Southeast Asia.
Another active international actor in the region is the European Union, which as a civilian power also pursues these same security interests in Southeast Asia. In the next chapter we will further discuss EU involvement in such fields of interest and how an interesting opportunity might arise for both powers to cooperate in the field of security.
This chapter contains the main part of my bachelor paper which really examines the Japanese perspective. Therefore, the next chapter, dealing on norms and actors within the EU, will be slightly shorter…or so I like to believe! 
Posted in April
Currently I’m working hard on my second and third chapter of my bachelor paper. These two chapters will contain the motherload of my analysis and argumentation on Japan-EU relations. That’s why succesfully compiling these two chapters will make or break the overall quality of my paper.
After digging up a book on ‘The Craft of Research’ in my humble personal library, and thorougly reading it, I concluded it might be wise to have some sort of blueprint before delving into data. This blueprint serves as some sort of skeleton which may give me an overview. Doing so, it is easier to keep your argumentation focused on the true aim of your paper. I’ve drawn my blueprint as a series of questions I want to address when talking about the various determinants of Japanese foreign policy. Once I had my general questions ready, I focused on each one individually to see what subquestions there might be. I tried to recollect what I asked myself when reading various sources on the topic. Simple journalistic questions like ‘when, who, what, why, how’ do come in handy, but also thinking what my reader might expect me to write, might be a nice safeguard against lacuna in my argumentation. After I had done this, I reorganised some of these questions into categories, which will become titles and subtitles after some rephrasing.
Below you can see my blueprint for the second chapter, which will discuss the various factors in Japanese foreign policy. The third chapter will discuss the EU side.
With the help of the already mentioned book:
Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb and Joseph M. Williams. “The Craft of Research.” Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Another valuable source for a student like me researching Japan-EU reciprocity is the work by Atsuko Abe. Because the book is published just as important events were taking place in Japan in 1993 with the historical defeat of the LDP, the contemporary reader might feel the book is a bit outdated. Since I’m focusing on actors vis-à-vis decision-making in the field of foreign policy of both Japan and the EU starting from 1993, I feel Julie Gilson’s work is more up to date. Nonetheless, the insights and references Abe provides are imperative to understand the present dynamics.
Especially the second chapter titled ‘The Japanese political economy and decision-making structure‘ contained some valuable information. The author starts with an explanatory summary of different approaches to analysing the Japanese decision-making process. I learned a great deal about
Still in the same chapter, Abe briefly describes the structure and characteristics of the Japanese bureaucracy. She claims that regardless which decision-making model is used, bureaucracy always takes a center role. No matter how you turn it. She touches upon two characteristics of the bureaucratic decision-making, namely its reactive nature and proactive nature. I was surprised to see Abe claim that Japanese policy can be proactive. She gives an example to back up her claim, for instance the Joint Declaration between Japan and the European Community, a topic I also incorporated in my first chapter. I admit the author is right when she says we thus shouldn’t generalise Japan’s ‘reactive‘ posture. But then again, Japan’s the few examples I have seen so far of a Japanese proactive attitude aren’t overwhelming enough to drop the ‘reactive’ name tag. I would even dare say that in its rare proactive stance, you could even recognize a certain form of 外圧 gaiatsu or foreign pressure for Japan to take a position. Abe works out the Joint Declaration in special research case, further in the book.
Abe also adresses the 天下り amakudari phenomenon: retired bureaucrats who either take senior positions at companies which are searching for a stake in the decision-making proces, or who either go to political parties (again namely the LDP) where they are used to temper the ambitions of their former collegues in the powerful ministeries. A very interesting given.
In addition, the author also talks about セクショナリズムsekushonarizumu or the strong rivalry between powerful ministeries like MoF (Ministry of Finance) or MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) leading to sectionalism. I also vaguely recall the name of MITI has changed since then.
Abe also briefly talks about ‘decision-making in the European Community‘. Similar to Japan, the year 1993 is very important in Europe, where thanks to the Maastricht Treaty the European Union was created. Therefore I prefer a more up to date work like “The Foreign Policy of the European Union” by Stephan Keukelaire. In his description though, Abe outlines the importance of interest groups with regards to European policy making. A practice still present in Brussels to this day, if I’m correct.
As you can see this second chapter has been very valuable for me. It also reminded me of important authors in the field, like Chalmers Johnson.
The first chapter of the book may also proof useful, since Abe outlines the different frameworks used in the study of international relations in general. I could use these perspectives in my introduction to give the reader an idea in what perspective I’m looking at Japan-EU relations.
The rest of the chapters are case-studies, where Abe works out various claims.
Abe, Atsuko. Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations. London: Athlone, 1999.
Posted in Bibliography, March
During the previous weeks I’ve been writing for my bachelorpaper. My aim was to finalize the first draft of my first chapter, appropiately titled Chapter I – A Historical Overview. Much to my delight, I had already done much of the work on the corpus. Now it just needed a good introduction, a summarizing conclusion, and my own critical eye to see if there were no unnecessary details.
As my main source, I used Julie Gilson’s “Japan and the European Union” (also see this previous post). In the second chapter “Developing Cooperation, 1950s-80s” she uses a very chronological structure, easy to grasp. Obviously, for a brief historical overview like mine, the timeline she provides in this chapter is essential. Although I must admit, the real trick was to have a critical view on what is important to absorb and what is not. Gilson gives all the fundamentals, but sometimes goes into great detail as to what meeting took place on what date et cetera. Essential to a book on Japan-EU relations, I’m sure, but unnecessary for a brief historical overview of about seven pages. I think this is certainly true, if you consider a bachelorpaper to be around 25 to 30 pages (around 90k of characters with spaces). So let’s hope I’ve been able to stick to the essence. Of course it’s but a first draft and I still have time to adjust many errors and irregularities in time for the first draft deadline of March 31 and my final deadline of June 1.
Additionally, these are the various sources I’ve used (preliminary list, Chicago A style).
Some still need to be checked on publishing information.
Below I’ll present a little preview of the first chapter (first draft and thus subject to change) To be more precize, it’s the conclusion of the first chapter. The rest stays under wraps for a little while longer ^^.
In retrospect, we saw two different foreign policies being developed in postwar Europe and Japan: a proactive and integrationist foreign policy in Europe and a reactive foreign policy in Japan, both economically independent, but security-wise linked to the US. Thanks to the supporting role of the US, we observed the beginning of Japan-Europe relations in the Fifties and Sixties. The bulk of these relations were bilateral, since Japan feared European integration would exclude it from trade opportunities. However, Western Europe’s integration process didn’t yet reach a high level of cohesion, since the European Commission wasn’t able to conduct an effective foreign policy. In the Seventies, economic conditions, the developing structures of the Community and a new international role for Europe, stimulated Japanese interest, who came to see Europe as an alternative to the US. As a consequence, relations institutionalised in this decade. We concluded with the Eighties, where despite some serious trade disputes like the Poitiers Incident, both parties explored new political facets in their relationship. It’s precisely this newfound political relationship Europe and Japan meant to deepen during the Nineties, or what was to be a ‘New Era in Japan-Europe Relations’. How this precisely manifested, will be outlined in the following chapters.
Don’t be surprised if the final version doesn’t resemble this, after all, it’s a first draft.
Posted in Bibliography, March
Recently, not so optimistic news was reported on Japan’s economy. Apparently, world’s second biggest economy experienced such bad results in the October-December period (3.3 percent down), which translates to a – 12.7 percent annual pace. (see 産経新聞 on 16 feb 2009 【ＧＤＰ大幅減】景気の底「２２年以降」 民間エコノミスト retrieved on 23 feb 2009)
However, thanks to the sewage of the small Japanese town of Suwa in Nagano prefecture, the Japanese don’t need to worry any longer!
(added on CNN.com 22 feb 2009, retrieved on 23 feb 2009)
Start of a goldrush eastwards?
Posted in February, News Article
Japanese newspapers Asahi 朝日新聞, Mainichi 毎日新聞, Sankei 産経新聞 and Yomiuri 読売新聞 have published some interesting articles on Clinton’s visit to Asia.
As I write this post, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s visit to Asia isn’t over yet. Eventhough, there are some interesting elements to be observed.
First remarkable element is the region itself. The fact that Clinton’s first foreign visit is to the East Asian region and not Europe signals the growing importance of Asia to the US and world politics. Moreover, Clinton first set foot in Japan, a very important sign that Japan still is the US’ most important ally in the region. While in Japan she also met Prime Minister Taro Aso, with who she discussed the current financial crisis. Taro Aso will also be the first foreign leader to visit Obama in the White House. Hilary Clinton adressed the North Korean problem (missile threat and abductions) and the need for China to take a more constructive posture in world politics, especially concerning climate change and human rights. Although these are opinions both Japan and the United States share, Clinton also urged the Japanese to take a more responsable role in UN peacekeeping missions and the protection of the traderoute near the Somalian coast. (see Asahi Shimbun 18 feb 2009 同盟強化、経済危機協力で合意 首相・クリントン氏会談 retrieved on 17-2-2009)
Important stops during the visit to Asia were, other than Japan, South Korea (demanding an end to provocative missile test and an end to the nuclear programme), Indonesia (to stress the importance of ASEAN) and China (to stress the growing interdependence between China and the US). In China, Clinton talked about the necessity of more cooperation in the fields of military security and the economy. Over the years, the US and Chinese economies have become interwoven. China’s huge cash reserve consists of mainly US treasury bonds and because of this China is the biggest creditor ($ 696 billion) of US debt after Japan ($ 578 billion) (see official site of US Treasury dec 2008 numbers). And that makes that around half of the US treasury bonds are owned in Asia (already true in 2004, see this interesting article in the Asia Times) . On the other hand, if the economy in the US slows down (the US is currently in a recession), then the demand for Chinese goods will take a plunge as well, with social unrest in China as a possible result. Clinton also repeated her call for China to get on board in order to deal with climate change. And finally, while Clinton made clear that she didn’t want to intervene in domestic Chinese issues, she addressed the desire to improve human rights in China. (see Mainichi Shimbun 21 feb 2009 米中外相会談：共同会見の要旨 retrieved on 21-2-2009; also see CNN.com “Clinton sets framework for U.S.-Asia relations” retrieved on 23 feb 2009)
It’s interesting to see where the stance of the US vis-à-vis Japan (and Asia in general) is heading, what the motivations are and what implications it will hold for the world and perhaps the EU? Considerable questions, since the US still is an important third actor in relations between the EU and Asia.
Posted in February, News Article
The exam period has passed and a new semester has begun. During this new semester most of the work on my bachelorpaper will take place. I will do my best to keep some discipline in updating this blog, as I get to read more sources on my bachelor paper subject.
Currently I’m reading “Japan and the European Union: a partnership for the twenty-first century?” by Julie Gilson, a British researcher who has extensive knowledge on Europe-Asia relations. She has collaborated on several books on the topic of EU-Asia, Japan’s international relations, et cetera.
If you’d like to do some more research on this aspect of international relations, her works are a must-read.
At the moment I’m writing a short chronological history chapter for my bachelor paper. In her book, Gilson sheds some light on the transformation of Japan-EU relations starting with the postwar years. She discusses every decade, the early postwar years, the 1950 and 1960′s which were characterised by a wary attitude towards one another, the start of some institutionalised form of talks in the 1970′s, and the growing political interaction between the two parties in the 1980′s. Next, Gilson discusses some of the internal factors which influence the intensity of relations in the 21st century, and in chapter 5 she discusses the 1990′s.
This truly is a helpful book for students who wish to learn more about the step-by-step nature of Japan-EU relations. Not only is there a handy chronological timetable included, the author also discusses some interesting turning points, like the Poitiers Incident, both of the Nixon shocks and various visits by the European Commissions and Japanese Prime Ministers. And most importantly, there’s considerable mention of internal factors (no unity in Europe, a suspicious Japan) and outside factors (the role of the US and Cold War).
Gilson, Julie. Japan and the European Union: a partnership for the twenty-first century? Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
Posted in Bibliography, February
Well, as you may or may not have noticed, I’m not posting a lot of new articles the past few weeks. This is not due to a shortage of material or a declining interest. Not at all. Recently I went to a conference on EU-Japan relations in Brussels. With the presence of a lot of high level speakers, I was able to collect a lot of information, but moreover, I’ve experienced first hand how large international conferences between Japan and EU intellects and officials work. I’ll be sure to write down my findings in the near future.
The true reason why I can’t blog all that much, is the time of the year. The whole month of january I’ll be having university exams, and that means I’m in the middle of studying.
So during december and january, expect some thumbleweed to roll through this blog. Afterwards, of course, we’ll pick up where we left off.
Nice holidays to all of you!
Posted in December
Read this article by the Associated Press recently. We all know that since World War II, Japan has been one of the most protectionist countries in the world. Now apparently, with the global financial crisis, some walls will have to come down if the EU and Japan want an equal part in the “next global order”.
Richard Collasse from the European Business Council in Japan, representing more than 3000 corporations and individuals, believes that the Japanese economic strategy of agressive export and protectionist import is outdated. The global financial crisis learns that Japanese companies are having a harder time getting investments in the country and due to an expensive yen, export is falling back as well. The only solution is that the EU and Japan work together, by opening up borders vis-a-vis capital, working visas, common industry guidelines, international acceptable product requirements, et cetera. Together doing so, the EU and Japan develop a common synchronous economy, hoping to be the trendsetter in a new global order.
Now, this is an idea we’ve heard before of course. Especially from the European side, I might add. During the 80′s and 90′s, Europeans were already (and with reason) complaining about dumping techniques by the Japanese and a hard to penetrate domestic market in Japan, hostile to foreign products. I agree, that in these special times, we need special measures. But calling for Japan to lower its ‘defence walls’, while we are experiencing the same protectionist tendencies in Europe, is a bit…well…unfair. Moreover, it’s totally denying the true origin of the global crisis and definition of a “new world order”. The current world order is dominated by the triangle US-Japan-EU. How could a new world order arise when the weakest link of this triangle fortifies? We don’t need the US, with its vast economy, anymore? And didn’t the current crisis proof we can’t handle such global phenonema with just the rich countries (G8)? No, if there’s something we’ve learned with the current economic crisis, it’s surely that we need some more supervisory organs on a global level, able to tackle the problem, and in coordination with the big emerging countries as well. I’m talking of course of the BRIC countries (Brasil, Russia, India, China) and maybe even ASEAN. The G20 summit in Washington didn’t give us a lot, but at least installed the idea of global governance. Only that way, we can have a grasp on a global economy, through regulation by global governance. Let’s work towards such a goal, instead of resorting back to ‘them-vs-us’ policies!
PS. I won’t be posting a lot this week, since I have been attending a conference on EU-Japan relations in Brussels and coming weekend I’ll be in France, taking part in a Japanese language immersion. See you next week!
Posted in Bibliography, News Article, November
Today a new site has launched, called Europeana. Digitally collecting many cultural and historical objects important to European history, this promises to be a site to keep your eye on! A nice initiative by the European Commission. And yes, there’s some Japanese related stuff in there as well. Also, have a look at the handy timeline!
Funny though, 50% of the content comes from France, 1% from Germany! Two-speed Europe on the information highway as well?
Posted in Bibliography, November, Random, Tools
Two years ago, when I was attending a course on “Japanese Economy”, we were introduced to a lecturer named Jörn Keck. Mr. Keck is a retired ambassador of the European Commission to Japan. He is now the vice-president of the Asia Institute Europe, based in Brussels. Needless to say, with his extensive first hand experience on the matter, a whole new world opened for us students.
Thanks to the small size of our class, merely ten students, we were able to interact with Mr.Keck and gain a introductory insight concerning Japan-EU relations. As you may have guessed, this course was a large motivation for me to write a bachelor paper on the subject and specialize myself in the matter in the future.
However, this lecture took place almost two years ago, and I had swapped computers over two times already. My copy of the lecture’s slides ended up somewhere in an old box. But not anymore! Recently, I retrieved the slides. I’m very happy about this, because the slides provide a valuable timeline which may serve as a starting point for my thesis!
Turns out you can also retrieve the slides on the site of the Asia Institute Europe. Doh!
Posted in Bibliography, Lecture, November
In the NY Times I read a good article (dated 2006) on the post-Cold War difference between Europe and Japan. Very suitable, since my last post also kind of explained the differences in regionalism between Europe and East Asia.
Roger Cohen, the author, describes Japan and Germany and their relation with the US. Both countries were nestled under the US umbrella until the end of the Cold War. Starting from this historic moment onwards, Germany gratefully pursued its own path. Japan stayed more or less under this umbrella. The author explains why: Communism was defeated in Europe, while communism never really vanished in Asia. Arguments with China concerning WWII, North Korean misiles pointed at Japan … , these things still manifest themselves in the Far East.
Furthermore, and this is very interesting for my bachelor paper, the author stresses that Germany differs from Japan, because Germany is part of the EU. And being part of such an institution gives Germany more independence from the US. There’s no similar institution in Asia. And because of how Japan was perceived in Asia, and because of the strong bond between Koizumi and Bush, Japan moved away from a similar institution in Asia. According to the author, I must add (there are Japanese efforts for regionalism, I believe). Nonetheless, very interesting to see the authors view on certain benefits for the EU and/or Japan.
Also, this author uses a same source for these claims as do Prof. Vanoverbeke and Mr. Ponjaert use among others: Buruma Ian, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1994.
Cohen, Roger. In Tokyo and Berlin, opposite views on U.S. The New York Times Online. April 8, 2006. <http://select.nytimes.com/iht/2006/04/08/world/IHT-08globalist.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>. (November 8, 2008)
Posted in Bibliography, News Article, November
Much to my delight, I received a very valuable journal I requested from my supervisor, Mrs. Atanassova. ‘Studia Diplomatica’ is an established journal by Brussels think thank EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations. It mainly focuses on “European integration, the EU as a strategic actor, global governance, terrorism and on Central Africa”. In short, topics of interest to European policy making.
The issue in my possession discusses Japan-EU relations, hence it’s subtitle: Japan-European Union: A Strategic Partnership in the Making. Very similar to my blog title, wouldn’t you say (confirmation I’m on the right track…).
Various articles can be found in this journal ranging from the direct relations between Japan and the EU to more indirect relations through various global mechanisms like ASEM.
In this post I’ll vent my opinion a bit on an interesting article called Japan in East Asia: the Dynamics of Regional Cooperation from a European Perspective. In future posts, I’ll give a summary on other articles.
The article was written by Mr. Ponjaert and Prof. Vanoverbeke, two researchers I know through my own university and I have great respect for. Two years ago, I was enrolled in a course by the two, where I learned a great deal on Japanese policy making and Japan’s role in East Asian regionalism. I gained a profound interest in the matter and as a result I co-wrote a lengthy article on Japan-ASEAN relations.
By reading this journal article I hoped to be introduced to a new perspective on Japan-Europe relations.
I must say I’m not disapointed, the two authors shed a light on Europe’s significance to East Asian regionalism. In today’s globalising world we see various regionalisms taking place. One of the best known examples is the EU. In fact considered as old regionalism, European regionalism was molded just after WWII. In various steps the EU evolved from “a free trade area, to a customs union, to a common market, to a monetary union to finally reach deep economic and political integration” (p.98). This way the EU became a primary example of regionalism and consequently we tend to have a eurocentric view when talking about other newer regionalisms.
And that’s the message the two authors want to emphasize, a European model doesn’t necessarely work in a distant region like East Asia. Whereas the EU has a formal structure with a social and integrating goal, East Asian regionalism tends to have informal structures with a pragmatic goal. The East Asian open regionalism differs quite a bit from the European variant. Therefore, having a eurocentric view on the matter in East Asia is talking through one’s hat. In my opinion this doesn’t mean however, regionalism structures like the EU can’t contribute to a genuine East Asian regionalism.
The real problem in East Asia is, though, that when you have this kind of lose and open regionalism through non-legally binding, informal agreements somebody needs to take a leading role. In the EU there’s a supranational body for many fields like agricultural, business competition and in the Eurozone even a supranational monetary policy. Because of the informality in East Asia, you don’t have these supranational institutions. This leads to consensus-driven practices where not everybody has to agree (as long nobody strongly disagrees, and where leadership by stronger states is needed to guide the regionalism (p.103). In East Asia we only find two real capable leaders, Japan and China.
The article explains why these powers have been unable to steer the regionalism in East Asia. The inevitable frictions between Japan and China are of course of concern. But these traditional adversaries don’t just quarrel whith eachother, they also have a strong trade relationship. In this relationship the two giants try to complement eachothers markets with various products, without risking too much competition (p.105). This could be an ideal starting point for deeper regionalism. Besides a balance of power problem, we see domestic problems as well in both countries, which hinder more cooperation.
The case of Japan is discussed more in detail. In the past, Japan had ample opportunities to take a leading role in the East Asian regionalism process. Take the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 for example. Being world’s second biggest economy, Japan should have taken a more swift response in order to stabilise the region’s financial markets. However, Japan’s measures failed and this harmed Japan’s regional position. (NB. East Asia countered the financial crisis through the Chiang Mai initiative, which resulted in monetary cooperation, well before the conceivement of a common market. This way East Asia is an contradictory to Balassa’s theory that regionalism has to go through different phases like the EU did). While the financial crisis inflicted damage on Japan’s position, other previous events had already impacted Japan’s perception in Asia. For example, the 1991 collapse of its bubble economy, the first Gulf War and Japan’s checkbook-diplomacy (see previous post).
All these problems and incapability to react in a right manner can be linked to Japan’s domestic political system. Untill well into the 90′s, Japan’s decision making system can be described as slow, bureaucratic and ineffective, as well as inefficient. The Prime Minister didn’t have full power, the bureaucrats did. Before reacting to a crisis, the Prime Minister had to consult different bureaucratic agency’s and levels. And as I already pointed out in a previous post, different ministery’s would compete among eachother. As you can imagine it took some time for the Japanese to reach concensus. In short, Japan was unable to respond to any international crisis in a swift and satisfactory way.
But although the 90′s were a Lost Decade for Japan in many aspects, it was somewhat of a wake up call. Japan realised it had to take up responsibility and had to move away from the old Yoshida doctrine. During the 90′s we see various reforms, partly thanks to the historical election of 1993 when a coalition of eight opposition parties was able to form a goverment. It was a critical break with the old policy’s by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), which had reigned for several decades. Although the opposition government only stayed in power for 11 months, a fresh breeze was noticable in Japanese politics.
It is also in this decade we see a determined, fresh, rebelling politician named Koizumi coming into the spotlight. LDP aligned Koizumi pressed for reforms and ultimately succeeded in becoming president of the LDP and thus, as is often the case in Japan, Prime Minister. The Lost Decade didn’t prove to be that lost, after all.
With Koizumi in power we see a more determined Japan rising, willing to take its role in Asia. Especially after 9/11, when Japan’s hard power accompagnied its soft power (the SDF (Japanese Self Defence Forces) were authorised to play a rear role for American operations and today Japan has the 6th biggest military expenditure in the world). Japan seemed suddenly capable of reacting to a crisis situation. This was all thanks to important reforms. Bureaucratic officials became civil servants, meaning the public had the right to question certain decisions and officials had to answer to the public from now on. Even more importantly, in 1999 the Prime Ministers Office and the Cabinet Secretariat were reformed and granted more powers. When reacting to 9/11, the Prime Minister didn’t have to go through a web of bureaucratic offices anymore. Instead Koizumi, who was just merely half a year in power, consulted his coalition partner and his own party. Doing this Koizumi was capable of announcing his measures just 8 days after the attacks, and one month later he was able to introduce several bills concerning SDF in response to the crisis. We’re talking lightspeed in Japan!
However, with Koizumi, we saw a detoriating relationship with China. And the authors are right when they claim that, although it’s good Japan has found its voice again, East Asia needs a compatible Japan and China. It remains to be seen if this relationship can evolve in a win win situation for both countries and eventually for East Asia.
I’m fully aware this may be a bit out of the scope of my bachelor paper (at least the details). I do somehow feel the subject of regionalism can be of an added value to my paper. Seen as the EU sometimes tends to be an example to the East Asian regionalism process, this may (or should!) be reflected in relations with one of the leading countries in the region, Japan. Therefore, institutions like ASEM among others may be described in the paper. But of course it remains to be seen. I’m not writing an exhaustive book, but a bachelor paper of +-30 pages. Some editing to come, for sure……..
Vanoverbeke, Dimitri en Frederik Ponjaert. Japan in East Asia: the Dynamics of Regional Cooperation from a European Perspective. In Studia Diplomatica: Japan-European Union: A Strategic Partnership in the Making, Takako Ueta, Eric Remacle, Frederik Ponjaert (red.), 97-116. Brussels: The Royal Institute for International Relations, Vol. LX, 2007, N°4.
Posted in Bibliography, Journal, November, Studia Diplomatica
Although I seem to have a busy schedule these days, I managed to squeeze in some time to read a paper called “The EU-Japan relations: An evolving Partnership” by Anna Krasny.
She was a student at the European Studies section of the Catholic University of Leuven. The very same master course I intend to take next academic year. In fact, this master paper was suggested to me by my supervisor, Mrs. Atanassova. And I must say, it is an interesting read.
In this 63 pages counting paper, the author discusses the apparent weak link in the US-Japan-EU triangle, namely the Japan-EU relations. She starts off with a brief historic overview from the Second World War up untill the 90′s. Whereas her examination of the relations before the 90′s is summary, she proceeds with a more thorough description of various factual agreements from this era.
For starters, she discusses the Japan-EC Joint Declaration of 1991. It’s fascinating to see how MOFA (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was involved and tried to shut out other ministry’s. Now, I already know there’s a competitive drive between different ministry’s in Japan, and I was under the impression that MITI (Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry – the predecessor of today’s METI Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) was the indusputed champion in this. Turns out MOFA had some tricks up its sleeves as well.
Allow me to explain. Apparently, the EC insisted to add a clausal, stipulating ‘economic measures’ to open up both markets. We all know that the Japanese market is a very closed and protective market to Western competitors. This is mainly due to legal, bureaucratic and cultural boundaries. So I’m not that surprised the Japanese wanted to keep it that way. But what I didn’t know, is that there was another reason for MOFA to downplay such a provision of ‘economic measures’ in the declaration. Because in the case of an additional economic clausal, MOFA wouldn’t have sole jurisdiction and would have been forced to consult and get approval from MITI. Something they obviously wanted to avoid. It’s interesting to see that it was not just the EC who was divided over the exact content of the declaration (France wanted the economic clausal, the UK and the Netherlands didn’t find it necessary), but the Japanese as well had ‘structural issues’.
An intriguing subtlety, indeed. I always tend to believe the main hurdles are on the European side, seems I have to correct that opinion. Organisational issues were manifesting on both sides of the world.
The author also discusses later agreements between Japan and the EU, and as I expected, the US is always on the horizon.
Take the first Gulf War for instance. Up until then, Japan’s policy focused mainly on economical challenges. From the American Occupation Period until the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan didn’t have to worry about military security. Thanks to the US ‘umbrella’ Japan would be safe and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution even prohibited a true Japanese army. This allowed the Japanese to channel all of the attention to the economic revival of Japan. But as Japan developed into the second largest economy of the world, so did its trade deficit become bigger and bigger. Much to the frustration of the US and Europe. If that was not enough, the world community believed Japan didn’t take up enough responsibility whereas security is concerned.
When the Gulf War commenced, diplomatic pressure pushed Japan to contribute in the world’s safety problems. Japan hesitated a while, only to donate a sum of money when most of the troubles were almost over. Of course Japan couldn’t send any army, because officially it doesn’t have one. And increased Japanese investment in army equipment, is a very sensitive matter for its regional neighbours (especially China). Therefor, one can understand the uneasy position of the Japanese.
Notably though, the Japanese have tried to be more involved with world affairs after this occurrence, . For example, the many millions of dollars it contributed to war ravaged ex-Yugoslavia and even a summit in Japan on the matter. A move very much welcomed by Europe. A good sign to the world, Japan wanted to be part of world affairs which don’t just concern it’s own interests.
From then on, Japan has been active in various organisations where you wouldn’t expect them. Like the OSCE, where Japan, along with Korea, was give ‘Partner of Cooperation” status. Japan came to play a more active role in relation to ASEAN as well. Here, it provided extra stimulus, know-how and support. Of course, Japan didn’t do this just as a result of diplomatic pressure in the past, there were latent benefits as well. A stable eastern Europe, provides Japanese companies with ample investment opportunities. And in the case of ASEAN, a prospering South East Asia would be the ideal driving force for renewed economic activity in the region with Japan as a leading role, also known as Akamatsu’s ‘Flying Geese Paradigm‘.
What I’ve learned reading this paper, is the importance of diplomatic pressure on Japan during the 90′s. Surely, the pressure on Japan to share some of the burdens really defined Japan’s foreign relations, especially towards Europe. A very interesting evolution. The author of this paper correctly states that this could lead to another major dilemma for Japan. When taking a prominent role, will Japan favor soft power or hard power? And how will this affect the relations with Europe? It’s a difficult question to answer, because the answer is somewhat in between. Soft power means Japan has economic instruments to exercise power. Hard power means it has military instruments. We see Japanese soft power being exercised in Europe, but military power as well? Well, it turns out Japan used it’s soft power in hard power contexts. The author gives the example of Kosovo. Through its relationship with NATO,
Japan is able to keep on pursuing an ongoing non-military stance within a military context.
So that makes me conclude Japan was in fact taking up its international responsibilities in 90′s, but only through economic ‘soft power’ instruments, resulting in ‘checkbook-diplomacy’ (an essential term which oddly enough doesn’t occur in the paper). My guess is, only with Koizumi and afterwards, Japan would pursue more ‘hard power’ instruments as well. Of course, most obviously, the attacks of 9/11 caused this switch of policy, but as pointed out hereabove, this ‘growing responsibility’ of Japan really jumpstarted a decade earlier. I’ll have to read up on this evolution, that I’m sure of.
Reading this paper, I’m convinced I have to research this soft power issue a bit more, seen as it defines Japan’s foreign relations really well. However, I missed the importance of Japan’s own economic woes during the so called Lost Decade. In my opinion this subject wasn’t stressed that much. The paper sums up the different agreements very well, but I miss some underlying causes and contexts. I have to add though, this is the nature of a master paper, and even more of a bachelor paper. Due to the limit of 30 pages (bachelor paper) you can only touch on so many aspects… This makes your explanation a bit brief, while maybe more in depth analysis is needed. I’ll have to take special care of this balance, when writing my own paper.
Krasny, Anna. 2005. The EU-Japan relations: An Evolving Partnership. Master paper, European Studies, Catholic University of Leuven, 2004-2005.
Posted in Bibliography, November, Paper
So last weekend I took part in a European Union Simulation called LECEUS (see previous post).
The experience gave me a profound understanding concerning European decision making.
The event tried to simulate various European Council meetings on today’s hot topics. The European Council is the meeting of European ministers. When financial matters are being discussed, all European ministers of Finance meet; if they want to discuss Georgia, all of the ministers of Foreign Affairs meet, et cetera. I was in the GAERC (general affairs) council, and was representing the glorious nation of Sweden
We had to discuss the proposed pipeline Nabucco which is planned to connect the European Energy Community to the rich gas and oil reserves of the Caspian Sea. However, this pipeline is to run through Turkey, and therefore the matter becomes politically sensitive. As representatives of all 27 EU members we had to decide how the EU should approach Turkey in order to increase energy independency from Russia. As we all know, Turkey wants to be a member of the EU, a difficult exercise for both parties so far.
The negotiations were divided in different levels, just like the real life EU decision making process. We started off with the working group level, where various technical issues are being adressed. The representatives are experts in their field who examine the European Commission’s proposal and have to overcome initial hurdles that need additional legal or other mechanics. Once that is done, there’s a foundation on which further negotiations can proceed.
There was a problem however, Turkey wasn’t interested in becoming a EEC member and was linking any further cooperation to a future accession into the EU. In the early stage of the working group level, it was very clear Cyprus didn’t like these developments and insisted that Turkey can’t become a member of the EU. Cyprus needed guarantees first that Turkey acknowledges its goverment and takes constructive steps regarding the Cyprus issues. An alliance of Sweden, the UK and Spain stressed that linking the Cyprus issue to the EEC negotiations could harm Europe’s future energy security. Eventually Cyprus conceded with the promise that we would discuss Cyprus when talking about Turkey accession.
Sweden was also able to add the Georgia issue to the proposal, since the Nabucco pipeline’s only possible connection to the Kaspian and Caucasian region is through Georgia, which is in peril since the recent troubles with Russia. It was the opinion of Sweden and other allied members that Georgia was very much of importance to the EEC. Furthermore, it was agreed to keep options open and add negotiations with Iran to the proposal.
Some of the representatives, seen from the seats of the Commissioner and Presidency
The next level was the COREPER level. Here we find the permanent representatives of the EU members. They discuss the matter further and agree on A and B points. An A point is a topic which is agreed upon during the COREPER negotiations, this topic doesn’t need any further discussion on the next level, the ministerial level. The only formality is that the minister signs/agrees on these A points once more. When there’s no agreement during the COREPER level, these topics or B points get passed on to the ministerial level. In most cases, these are politically sensitive issues. Of course, an obvious B point was the accession of Turkey into the EU.
For a very brief moment there was also talk of a ‘false B point’ by Sweden and Spain. A false B point is a politically sensitive issue which has been agreed upon during the COREPER meeting, but nonetheless is passed on to the ministerial level to make it appear that ministers had a thorough discussion on it as well.
Our false B point was as follows. Most countries initially expressed their concerns about an accession timetable. One camp deemed it impossible for Turkey to join the EU in the next 25 years. The other camp raised the importance of Turkey and was in favor of an accession no later than 2012. Sweden, as a mediator (and also very much in favour) proposed a compromise which would set a timetable ‘in the next decade‘. With this compromise and a lot of heated debates the COREPER meeting was almost able to bring concensus. The most ardent of critics like Germany and France were willing to give in (Cyprus abstained). However, the presidency of the EU (France) added the matter to the proposal as follows:
an indefinite timetable for accession in the next decade
Especially this last word frustrated the Spanish and Swedish delegations. Incorporating the word ‘indefinite’ didn’t rule out the possibility that a decade could very well become 25-50-75 years. The two kingdoms pointed out that Turkey should be convinced the timetable would have an eventual end. And so, very much like it probably is in the diplomatic world, we had a long, very long discussion about a single world in the text. Quite funny. In the end, there was no agreement and the possible false B point became a solid B point.
Actually an American Commissioner. ヨーロッパ負けたのか
On the last day we had our ministerial summit. We had some more debates on the two B points: accession and a timetable. But in the end we were able to agree on all points.
As you call tell it was a very interesting experience and I can only recommend it to anyone interested in the EU and multilateral decision making. It was very interesting to compare our findings to the actual EU negotiations, which will most likely agree on the very same points (but probably not all). The representative of Greece, however, was a bit dissapointed we didn’t agree on innovative idea’s. Greece, for one, proposed to lead the cooperation with Turkey on a bilateral basis. A bold idea, which was very unexpected and innovative. On the other hand, Sweden and Spain couldn’t agree on this, since this would create a dangerous precedent where the other EU counries would be left out. France and Italy were very much in favour of a pipeline to Algeria. Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were against, since this would only benefit already prosperous nations within the EU. While we all very much agreed that Turkey’s accession and a pipeline would be able to bring extra (much needed) economic stimulus to EU members at the shores of the Black Sea.
Another thing I learned was the importance of (informal) lobbying and making alliances. Something we were able to practise during informal drinks, a trip to the European institutions in Brussels and a talk with some policy makers, a formal dinner and Leuven’s nightlife. Lots of fun, indeed! All of this will be very valuable for my bachelor paper, I’m sure. Other than that, and now we proceed to the pretentious part of this post, I received a price for ‘Sweden’s outstanding achievements during the negotiations in GAERC’. I received a certificate, Belgian chocolates and a photo moment. Didn’t expect that!
Not my best picture though...
But the best thing I got out of this experience are the many new friends I’ve made during these four days. They came from allover Europe, and hopefully I’ll meet them again in the future. Who knows in what capacity.
The entire group of participants, from all the corners of the world.
Welcome to the new blog called Japan-EU relations! This new start-up aims to share some basic principles, key-moments, opportunities and challenges that characterize the relationship between these two powerful actors in world affairs.
First of, I’d like to talk a bit about myself and why I feel there’s a need for a blog on this subject.
I’m currently a student, enrolled at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. There I’m majoring in Japanese Studies with a firm minor in economic policy and management. This year I’ll be writing a bachelor paper in order to receive my bachelors degree. I have chosen to examine the relations between Japan and the EU since 1993.
Why even bother starting a blog? Well, I reckon that a blog will serve many means.
The most important question hasn’t been answered yet, why Japan-EU relations? Shouldn’t I write about the wonderful Japanese world of samurai, hikikomori, manga and/or videogames? Viable options, I’m sure, but I would prefer to write on something more encompassing. Something that concerns us all, a matter which is rarely discussed but is frequently in the news, such a topic is ideal to write about in a bachelor paper. (Providing there are enough sources of course …)
And so, an idea came to fruition. Why not write on Japan-EU relations? This came into play, especially when I was doing my study-abroad at Osaka University. It’s sort of weird, but I found that being in Japan, gave me much more insight in Europe. Through conversations with fellow European students, I realised all the different notions, idea’s and identities which exist in present day Europe. It’s not untill you’re removed from that milieu in Europe, that you start to develop an eagle eye, a keen ability to observe the world you normally live in. You are exempt from all influences by politicians, dominant (mis)conceptions and you get to experience why and how others view you world.
And especially such an attitude is essential when writing a paper on Japan-EU relations. Since I’m talking about an academic paper, it’s imperative to maintain an objective tone. But also, I need to make sure both sides are addressed. Only then, can we understand the true nature of the beast. Although I must admit, the vantage point will be mainly Japanese. This is due to the fact I can only write about 20 to 25 pages on the subject. And even though I’ll probably be doing a master in European Studies next year, in first instance I’m still a japanology student hoping to obtain this bachelors degree through this paper. Perhaps next year, I can delve much deeper into the issue when writing my masters thesis.
To conclude, I would like to invite you to regularly check this blog. You can see my idea’s develop, witness the evolution of my bachelor paper, and perhaps see a different view on European, Japanese and other worldly affairs. I, from my part, will try and keep this blog updated of course, but with one request. Should your opinion differ from mine, I would like to hear from you. Simply write a reaction to my post, one that agrees, or one that doesn’t, it’s all the same! Because a minimal goal is to inform and maybe even get people talking on the subject.
Kind regards,
Thomas Jansen
Posted in October | Tags: bachelor paper, bilateral relations, Catholic University of Leuven, EU, Europe, international relations, Japan, KU Leuven
